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Abstract 
Previous research has shown that linking approach or avoidance actions to novel stimuli through 
mere instructions causes changes in the implicit evaluation of these stimuli even when the actions 
are never performed. In two high-powered experiments (total N = 1147), we examined whether 
effects of approach-avoidance instructions on implicit evaluations are mediated by changes in 
explicit evaluations. Participants first received information about the evaluative properties of two 
fictitious social groups (e.g., Niffites are good; Luupites are bad) and then received instructions to 
approach one group and avoid the other group. We observed an effect of approach-avoidance 
instructions on implicit but not explicit evaluations of the groups, even when these instructions 
were incompatible with the previously obtained evaluative information. These results indicate 
that approach-avoidance instructions allow for unintentional changes in implicit evaluations. We 
discuss implications for current theories of implicit evaluation. 
Keywords: approach, avoidance, training, instructions, implicit attitudes, evaluation 
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Instructing Implicit Processes: When Instructions to Approach or Avoid Influence Implicit 
but not Explicit Evaluation 
The way in which humans evaluate stimuli as good or bad has long been a central 
research topic in various sub-disciplines of psychology (Allport, 1935). In contemporary research 
on evaluations, researchers often contrast deliberate, explicit evaluations and spontaneous, 
implicit evaluations (see De Houwer, 2009a; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Typically, 
theorists have postulated distinct underlying processes, with explicit evaluations resulting from 
belief-based processes that involve the validation of propositional information, and implicit 
evaluations being the product of processes involving the automatic activation of associations in 
memory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). 
Given the unique relation between implicit evaluations and behavior (Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009), it is vital to understand how implicit stimulus evaluations 
are acquired and can be changed. Because implicit evaluation is traditionally attributed to the 
activation of associations between representations in memory and because associations are typically 
thought to develop gradually over many experiences, it is sometimes assumed that implicit 
evaluations of stimuli arise exclusively as the result of repeated experiences, such as recurrent 
pairings of physical stimuli (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Evaluative conditioning (EC) research 
provides ample evidence that changes in the implicit evaluation of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; 
CS) occur when it is paired with a valenced stimulus (unconditioned stimulus; US; for a review see 
Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Moreover, research on approach 
and avoidance (AA) training has suggested that changes in implicit evaluations can be obtained by 
pairing a stimulus with a valenced action (i.e., approach or avoidance). Typically, the repeated 
approaching of one stimulus and avoiding of another stimulus leads to more positive implicit 
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evaluations for the former stimuli (e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007; Woud, 
Maas, Becker, & Rinck, 2013; but see Vandenbosch & De Houwer, 2011). 
Recent research has, however, shown that implicit evaluations change even when pairings 
are not experienced directly, but are implied by the verbal presentation of relational information 
via instructions. For instance, studies on instructed EC have shown that changes in the implicit 
evaluation of a CS occur when verbal instructions link a CS with a valenced US even when the 
CS-US pairings are not experienced directly (De Houwer, 2006; Gast & De Houwer, 2012). 
Similarly, in a recent study we observed typical AA training effects when participants did not 
actually perform AA actions, but were merely instructed that they would later have to perform 
these actions (Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2015). That is, participants who received 
instructions to approach one fictitious social group (e.g., Niffites) and avoid another fictitious 
social group (e.g., Luupites) showed a preference for the former group both on implicit measures 
(i.e., the Implicit Association Test, IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998; and the 
evaluative priming task, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) and explicit measures of 
evaluation. 
These findings pose a challenge to associative and dual-process models of evaluation 
which assume that implicit evaluations result from the gradual formation of associations in 
memory as the result of actual pairings (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). 
In contrast, contemporary dual-process models in which association formation processes can 
interact with propositional learning processes allow one to explain effects of instructions on 
implicit evaluations. For instance, the Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE) model 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 2011; 2014) postulates that associations may sometimes arise 
as the result of the generation and validation of propositions. More specifically, when people 
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determine in a propositional manner that a stimulus is either positive or negative this may 
instigate the proactive construction of new associations between representations of the stimulus 
and representations of positivity or negativity. As a result, any information that allows 
participants to consciously entertain the proposition that a stimulus is positive or negative may 
influence implicit evaluations. In line with this idea, changes in implicit evaluations have been 
observed when participants are provided with information about the valenced properties of a 
stimulus (Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith & Arcuri, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; Whitfield & 
Jordan, 2009; Cone & Ferguson, 2015). 
Importantly, these models predict a specific pattern of mediation such that instruction 
effects on explicit evaluation should mediate effects on implicit evaluation (see Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Case 4). That is, instructions should first influence whether participants 
consider a stimulus positive or negative (which is reflected in explicit evaluations) before this 
may lead to the formation of novel associations (which is reflected in implicit evaluations). 
Support for this idea was found by Whitfield and Jordan (2009), who observed that receiving 
information about the behavior of unknown individuals caused changes in implicit evaluations of 
these individuals that were fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. 
Contrasting this result, our previous study on AA instruction effects provided evidence 
that changes in explicit evaluations do not fully mediate effects of AA instructions on implicit 
evaluations. Statistical mediation analyses indicated that the impact of AA instructions on 
implicit evaluations was partly mediated by changes in explicit evaluations, but an effect 
remained after controlling for changes in explicit evaluation (Van Dessel et al., 2015). This is an 
intriguing finding because it suggests that mere (AA) instructions may sometimes cause 
unintentional changes in (implicit) stimulus evaluations. Instructions may have a direct effect on 
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implicit evaluation (i.e., unmediated by changes in explicit evaluation) and may therefore cause 
changes in implicit evaluations even when participants do not consider the instructions as a valid 
basis for their (explicit) evaluation. 
However, on the basis of the available evidence it is premature to conclude that AA 
instructions can influence implicit evaluation without any mediation by changes in explicit 
evaluation. Most importantly, our earlier AA instruction study (Van Dessel et al., 2015) included 
only statistical analyses of mediation. This measurement-of-mediation approach, however, is 
ultimately correlational in nature, and is thus problematic for establishing a causal chain 
(Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). This is especially the case when examining patterns of 
mediation between implicit and explicit evaluations. When a manipulation affects both implicit 
and explicit measures of evaluation, the particular direction of the obtained mediation pattern is 
strongly influenced by the internal consistency of the employed measure (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2011). Moreover, when implicit and explicit evaluations are strongly correlated (as 
was the case in our previous study), this creates multicollinearity which inflates the standard error 
of all variables in the mediation model and compromises the estimation of the indirect effect 
(Alin, 2010). Hence, when examining mediation of implicit and explicit evaluations, it is strongly 
recommended to supplement statistical mediation analyses with experimental manipulations (De 
Houwer, Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). This is particularly true if, as in our case, a 
theoretical debate requires the precise understanding of the causal relation. 
In the current studies, we used both a statistical and an experimental approach to test the 
extent to which the impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluation is mediated by changes in 
explicit evaluation. We manipulated the proposed mediating variable (i.e., changes in explicit 
evaluation) by providing participants with ‘trait instructions’ that should prevent an impact of AA 
 APPROACH-AVOIDANCE INSTRUCTION   7 
    
instructions on explicit evaluation. In line with Gregg et al. (2006), we asked participants to 
imagine that the members of one fictitious social group had very positive traits and the members 
of another fictitious social group had very negative traits (e.g., Niffites are peaceful, civilized, 
benevolent, and law-abiding; Luupites are violent, savage, malicious, and lawless). Subsequently, 
participants received instructions to approach or avoid these social groups. Whereas trait 
instructions directly specify the evaluative properties of the social group, AA instructions only 
provide evaluative information if participants infer that the task to approach or avoid members of 
a group tells something about the evaluative properties of that group. Participants might rely on 
this inference when they have no other information about the evaluative properties of the group, 
but even then they will probably be aware that this inference rests on shaky grounds. Prior 
research indeed suggests that participants are likely to refrain from using information that has a 
low diagnostic validity (such as AA instructions) when more valid information (such as 
instructions about evaluative traits) is available (Lynch, 2005; Cone & Ferguson, 2015). For these 
reasons, we expected that participants who received trait instructions would not take the AA 
instructions into account when explicitly evaluating the stimuli. We examined whether, under 
these circumstances, AA instructions would still cause changes in implicit evaluation. That is, we 
examined whether an AA instruction effect on implicit evaluation would be observed not only in 
the absence of mediation by changes in explicit evaluation, but even when there is no impact on 
explicit evaluation. The latter result would not only confirm that AA instructions can have a 
direct effect on implicit evaluation (because mediation via changes in explicit evaluation can 
occur only if there are changes in explicit evaluation) but would also support the novel 
conclusion that this direct effect can arise even when participants do not have the intention to use 
the AA instructions for evaluating the stimuli. 
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If we would find that AA instructions influence implicit evaluation in the absence of 
(mediation by) changes in explicit evaluation, this is bound to have important theoretical 
implications. First, it would strongly constrain current and future models of (implicit) evaluation. 
For instance, it would contradict dual-process models that assume that (1) only directly 
experienced repeated pairings can influence implicit evaluations (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), and 
it would contradict dual-process models that assume that (2) instructions can only influence 
implicit evaluation via the mediation of explicit evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
To accommodate these findings, dual-process accounts would need to make additional 
assumptions (e.g., that strong associations can form as the result of a single pairing of a valenced 
word and a stimulus even in the absence of changes in explicit evaluation). 
Finding an impact of AA instructions on implicit evaluation but not on explicit evaluation 
would also constrain single-process propositional models of evaluation (De Houwer, 2009b; 
2014; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). These models postulate that both implicit and 
explicit evaluations arise exclusively as the result of propositional processes. Prima facie, these 
models seem less equipped to explain dissociations between implicit and explicit evaluations 
(e.g., a change in implicit evaluation in the absence of a similar change in explicit evaluation). 
However, dissociations do not necessarily mean that different processes underlie these different 
types of evaluation. Rather, dissociations may arise because implicit and explicit measures of 
evaluation are differentially sensitive to the truth evaluation of propositional information. For 
example, when participants are told that a specific stimulus has to be approached, they might 
consider the possibility that this stimulus is good because it has to be approached. If this newly 
formed proposition can be activated automatically (e.g., in the sense of unintentional) then it may 
influence implicit evaluation even when the proposition is not considered valid (De Houwer, 
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2014). In contrast, explicit evaluation may be more contingent on the outcome of truth validation 
processes. 
Second, finding an AA instruction effect on implicit but not explicit evaluation would 
provide valuable information about the mechanisms that specifically underlie the acquisition of 
evaluations by means of AA training, that is, by means of the repeated actual performance of 
approach and avoidance responses. Currently, there is ample evidence that training-based effects 
involve changes in implicit evaluation that are not mediated by changes in explicit evaluations 
(Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009). These findings have typically been 
interpreted as evidence that training directly influences processes of association-formation. 
However, these effects might also reflect the acquisition of propositional information that 
specifically influences implicit evaluation (e.g., because it allows for the automatic activation of 
propositions) but not explicit evaluation (e.g., because the information is not considered a valid 
basis for evaluation). If we observe an impact of AA instructions on implicit but not explicit 
evaluations, this would support the idea that propositional information can indeed influence 
implicit evaluations independently of changes in explicit evaluation. 
We conducted two experiments to investigate whether the impact of AA instructions on 
implicit evaluations is mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. In Experiment 1, half of the 
participants first received instructions that specified the traits of the fictitious social groups. 
Subsequently, participants received instructions to approach the names of members of one of the 
social groups and avoid the names of members of the second social group. For half of the 
participants, these AA instructions were supplemented with actual AA training. We then assessed 
implicit and explicit evaluations of the social groups. With this design, two tests are possible of 
the hypothesis that AA instructions allow for a direct influence on implicit evaluation. First, it 
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can be tested whether AA instructions influence implicit evaluations even after statistically 
controlling for changes in explicit evaluations. Second, it can be tested if AA instructions 
influence implicit evaluations even if trait instructions prevent the effects of AA instructions on 
explicit evaluations. To investigate this issue, we supplemented standard significance tests with 
Bayesian analyses. Bayesian analyses were performed according to the procedures outlined by 
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009). These procedures provide a Bayes Factor 
(BF) that gives an indication of how strongly the data support either the null hypothesis (BF0; 
reflecting the absence of a significant effect) or the alternative hypothesis (BF1; reflecting the 
presence of a significant effect). BFs smaller than 1, between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, 
respectively designate ‘no evidence’, ‘anecdotal evidence’, and ‘substantial evidence’, for either 
the null or the alternative hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961). We examined whether, in the presence of 
trait instructions, AA instructions do not cause changes in explicit evaluation (i.e., analyses 
provide substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, BF0 > 3) yet still cause changes in implicit 
evaluation (i.e., analyses provide substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis, BF1 > 3). 
In Experiment 2, all participants received trait instructions and subsequently received 
either AA instructions that were compatible with these instructions (e.g., instructions to approach 
Niffites when participants had been asked to imagine that Niffites have positive traits), AA 
instructions that were incompatible with these instructions (e.g., instructions to avoid Niffites 
when participants had been asked to imagine that Niffites have positive traits), or no AA 
instructions. We examined whether changes in implicit evaluations arise in the absence of 
changes in explicit evaluations when AA instructions are compatible with the trait instructions 
(and thus strengthen the previously acquired evaluations) or when they are incompatible with the 
trait instructions (and thus revise the previously acquired evaluations). 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design. In Experiment 1, 1121 English-speaking volunteers participated 
online via the Project Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu). We employed a 2 
(Presence of Trait instructions: yes, no) x 2 (Content of AA Instructions: approach Niffites, 
approach Luupites) x 2 (Presence of AA Training: yes, no) between-subjects design (Table 1). 
Data-exclusion involved removing participants who (a) did not fully complete all questions and 
tasks (257 participants; i.e., 22.9%), or (b) made at least one error on the memory questions that 
probed memory for valence or AA instructions (189 participants; i.e., 21.9 %).1 After removing 
participants based on the previous two criteria, there were no additional participants who needed 
to be removed because of IAT error rates above 30% across the entire task, or above 40% for any 
one of the four critical blocks (Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2013). Analyses were performed on 
the data of 675 participants (440 women, mean age = 32, SD = 13).  
Procedure. All participants were first familiarized with the two fictitious social groups 
(i.e., Luupites and Niffites). They read that all the names of Luupites have two consecutive 
vowels in them and end with “lup”. Then they were shown two examples of Luupites’ names 
(i.e., Loomalup, Ageelup). Subsequently, participants read that all the names of Niffites would 
contain two consecutive consonants and end with “nif.” This statement was followed by two 
Niffites names (i.e., Borrinif, Kennunif). 
 Half of the participants were then given trait instructions. Similar to Gregg et al. (2006), 
participants were asked to imagine that these two social groups actually exist and to suppose that 
                                                 
1 We excluded participants with incorrect memory because we expected that, in line with previous results (Van 
Dessel et al., 2015), instructions would impact evaluations only if participants correctly remembered these 
instructions. Importantly, including the data from all participants in the analyses weakened the main effect of 
Content of AA Instructions and the main effect of Content of Trait instructions on implicit and explicit evaluations, 
but did not result in any shift in significance for any of the reported effects. 
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the two groups have very different characters. They were instructed that one group ‘are very good 
people; they are peaceful, civilized, benevolent, and law-abiding, whereas the other group ‘are 
very bad people; they are violent, savage, malicious, and lawless.’ Participants were also 
instructed to suppose that the two groups consistently behave in ways that justified these 
descriptions when they interact with each other and with other groups. Participants were asked to 
try and keep clear in their minds which group is which and which group possesses which 
characteristics as they would later be asked questions about the groups. Half of the participants 
who received trait instructions learned that Niffites are good and Luupites are bad, whereas the 
other half received instructions that conveyed the idea that Luupites are good and Niffites are 
bad. 
Subsequently, all participants received AA instructions. Half of the participants were told 
that they would have to approach each name of a Luupite and avoid each name of a Niffite. The 
other participants were given the opposite instruction. These AA instructions were followed by 
the information that we would later on explain exactly how they would be able to perform these 
actions, but that for now it was very important to remember which action they would have to 
perform with each type of name as they would need this information to complete the task 
successfully. 
  Following the AA instructions, only half of the participants actually performed the AA 
training task. This manipulation was orthogonal to (1) the manipulation of the content of trait 
instructions (Niffites are good and Luupites are bad / Niffites are bad and Luupites are good) and 
(2) the content of AA instructions (approach Niffites and avoid Luupites / avoid Luupites and 
approach Niffites). Participants in the AA training condition performed 80 trials of the AA 
training task in which 4 Niffites’ names (i.e., Cellanif, Eskannif, Lebbunif, Zallunif) and 4 
Luupites’ names (i.e., Meesolup, Naanolup, Omeelup, Wenaalup) were each presented ten times. 
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Participants pushed away names by pressing the up arrow on the keyboard (i.e., avoided) and 
pulled names towards them by pressing the down arrow on the keyboard (i.e., approached). A 
zoom effect enhanced the visual experience of approaching or avoiding; names that were avoided 
became smaller and moved off into the perceptual distance, whereas names that were approached 
became larger and appeared to move toward the participant. Only actions that were in line with 
the AA instructions were registered as correct and resulted in the zoom effect. Incorrect responses 
were not registered. Participants always had to perform the correct response to proceed to the 
following trial. The other half of the participants did not receive AA training and they were 
instructed that they would complete a reaction time task which would last approximately 10 
minutes before they could start the AA task. 
The reaction time task that followed was an IAT in which participants categorized 
positive words, negative words, and the names of members of both social groups into one of four 
categories: positive, negative, Niffites, or Luupites. The IAT followed the procedure described in 
more detail in Van Dessel et al. (2015). It consisted of three practice blocks and two experimental 
blocks. Participants began the IAT with 20 practice trials sorting the names of Niffites and 
Luupites and 20 practice trials sorting positive and negative stimuli. Next, participants completed 
56 trials in which stimuli related to Niffites and positive shared a single response key and stimuli 
related to Luupites and negative shared a single response key (half of the participants completed 
the IAT in this way, while the other participants began by sorting Luupites and positive with the same 
key). Participants then practiced sorting Niffites and Luupites names with the response key 
assignment reversed for 40 trials and finally participants completed a second set of 56 trials in 
which Niffites shared a response key with negative and Luupites shared a response key with 
positive (or vice versa). If the participant made an error in categorizing, a red “X” appeared on 
the screen and the participant corrected their mistake in order to continue. Latencies were recorded 
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until a correct response was made. IAT-scores were calculated using the D2-algorithm 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) so that positive scores indicate a preference for Niffites over 
Luupites. The Spearman-Brown corrected split-half reliability of the IAT score, calculated on the 
basis of an odd-even split, was r(675) = .84. 
After the implicit evaluation task, participants rated their liking of each of the social 
groups by answering two questions: “To what extent do you like Niffites/Luupites?” and “To 
what extent do you have warm feelings for Niffites and Luupites?”. Participants gave their ratings 
by selecting an option on a 9-point Likert scale (1= not warm/liked at all; 9 = completely 
warm/liked). Rating scores (i.e., warmth scores and liking scores) were calculated by subtracting 
the score rating for Luupites from the corresponding score rating for Niffites so that positive 
scores indicate a preference for Niffites over Luupites. Because of high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .94), we collapsed these score ratings into one explicit evaluation score by 
averaging the respective scores. This explicit evaluation score correlated significantly with the 
IAT score, r(673) = .43, p < .001. 
Finally, participants completed two types of manipulation check questions. The first 
question was completed only by participants who had received trait instructions. Participants 
were asked to remember which trait instructions were presented at the start of the study and to 
answer by selecting an option on a dropdown menu with “That Niffites are good and Luupites are 
bad”, “That Luupites are good and Niffites are bad”, and “I don’t remember” as possible answers. 
The next two questions asked what action they would have to perform (or had performed in the 
case of actual training) according to the instructions when the name of a Niffite/Luupite was 
presented. Participants answered by selecting an option on a dropdown menu with “Approach”, 
“Avoid” and “I don’t remember” as possible answers.  
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Results 
We split up the analyses for participants who did not receive trait instructions and 
participants who did receive trait instructions to separately address (1) whether AA instruction 
and AA training effects on implicit evaluations are fully mediated by changes in explicit 
evaluations, and (2) whether AA instructions and AA training cause changes in implicit 
evaluations even when trait instructions are provided. 
No trait instructions condition. We performed a 2 (Content of AA Instructions: approach 
Niffites, approach Luupites) x 2 (Presence of AA Training: yes, no) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on the IAT scores. Because there was an unequal number of participants per condition 
(no AA training: N = 96 for approach Niffites, N = 97 for approach Luupites; AA training: N = 
84 for approach Niffites, N = 87 for approach Luupites), we used type III sums of squares in this 
and all subsequent statistical analyses. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Content of AA 
Instructions, F(1,360) = 135.93, p < .001. Participants who had been instructed to approach 
Niffites and avoid Luupites (M = 0.13, SD = 0.43) preferred Niffites more than participants who 
had been instructed to approach Luupites and avoid Niffites (M = -0.27, SD = 0.55), d = 1.22, 
95% confidence interval (CI) [1.00, 1.45], BF1 > 10000. Neither the main effect of Presence of 
AA Training nor the interaction with Content of AA Instructions was significant, Fs < 0.93, ps > 
.33. 
An ANOVA on the explicit rating scores revealed a similar pattern. We observed only a 
main effect of Content of AA Instructions, F(1,360) = 52.49, p < .001, indicating that participants 
who had been instructed to approach Niffites and avoid Luupites preferred Niffites (M = 0.52, SD 
= 1.63) more than participants who had been instructed to avoid Niffites and approach Luupites 
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(M = -0.99, SD = 2.29), d = 0.76, 95% CI [0.54, 0.97], BF1 > 10000. We observed no main or 
interaction effects involving the Presence of AA Training factor, Fs < 1.33, ps > .24. 
To investigate the extent to which changes in implicit evaluation are mediated by changes 
in explicit evaluations we performed mediation analyses with the LAVAAN package (version 
0.5-16; Rosseel, 2012). We used the bootstrap method to estimate standard errors for the effects. 
Results indicated that changes in implicit evaluations were mediated by corresponding changes in 
explicit evaluations, both when participants received only AA instructions (Z = 2.31, p = .021), 
and when they received AA instructions and subsequent AA training (Z = 2.03, p = .042). 
Importantly, however, the AA effect on implicit evaluations remained significant after controlling 
for changes in explicit evaluations for participants without (Z = 5.65, p < .001) and with actual 
training (Z = 8.78, p < .001). Regression coefficients of the performed mediation analyses are 
provided in Appendix.  
Trait instructions condition. To examine AA effects in the context of trait instructions we 
performed a 2 (Content of AA Instructions: approach Niffites, approach Luupites) x 2 (Presence 
of AA Training: yes, no) x 2 (Content of Trait Instructions: Niffites are good, Luupites are good) 
ANOVA on the IAT scores of participants who had received trait instructions. We included the 
Content of Trait Instructions factor to estimate the effect of trait instructions on evaluations and 
control for the variance attributable to this factor. We observed a main effect of Content of Trait 
Instructions, F(1,303) = 183.27, p < .001, indicating that participants preferred Niffites more 
when Niffites were presented as positive and Luupites as negative (M = 0.23, SD = 0.48) than 
when Niffites were presented as negative and Luupites as positive (M = -0.45, SD = 0.46), d = 
1.45, 95% CI [1.20, 1.70], BF1 > 10000. This analysis also revealed a main effect of Content of 
AA Instructions, F(1,303) = 36.78, p < .001, but this effect was qualified by an interaction effect 
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of Content of AA Instructions x Presence of AA Training, F(1,303) = 5.02, p = .026 (Table 2). 
Importantly, a significant effect of Content of AA Instructions was observed for participants who 
had merely received AA instructions, F(1,150) = 7.44, p = .007, d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.12, 0.77], 
BF1 = 5.36. This effect was larger for participants who had received additional AA training, 
F(1,153) = 33.48, p < .001, d = 0.74, 95% CI [0.41, 1.06], BF1 = 1961.39. Finally, an interaction 
effect of Content of AA Instructions and Content of Trait Instructions, F(1,303) = 13.22, p <.001, 
indicated that the effect of Content of AA Instructions was stronger when trait instructions 
conveyed that Niffites are good and Luupites are bad than when trait instructions conveyed the 
opposite information.2 
An ANOVA on the explicit rating scores revealed a main effect of Content of Trait 
Instructions, F(1,303) = 222.10, p < .001. This effect was qualified by an interaction effect with 
Presence of AA Training, F(1,303) = 5.60, p = .019, which indicated that the effect of trait 
instructions was smaller for participants who received AA training, d = 1.47, 95% CI [1.11, 1.83], 
than for participants who received no AA training, d = 1.91, 95% CI [1.53, 2.30].3 Most 
importantly, we observed no main effect of Content of AA instructions, F(1,303) = 0.01, p = .90, 
d = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.28]. The BF score provided substantial evidence in favor of the null 
hypothesis (BF0 = 7.19). We also observed no other main or interaction effects, Fs < 2.66, ps > 
.10. 
                                                 
2
 This finding relates to the observation that, even in the absence of trait instructions, participants preferred Luupites 
over Niffites, and may indicate that AA effects are reduced if participants have clearly univalent positive or negative 
implicit evaluations (e.g., because they find Luupites’ names more appealing and they learned that Luupites are 
positive). Please consult Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, and Fazio (2013), and Woud, Becker, Lange, and Rinck (2013) for 
reasons why stimuli that have a non-ambivalent valence might be less susceptible to AA effects. 
 
3
 One possible explanation for this is that participants who received actual training may have been distracted from 
the trait instructions (e.g., because there was a longer delay between receiving these instructions and completing the 
evaluative rating task) and therefore used these trait instructions to a lesser extent for their evaluative ratings. 
Receiving the trait instructions, however, still discouraged participants from considering the AA information as a 
valid source of evaluative information. 
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Mediation analyses showed that changes in implicit evaluations were not significantly 
mediated by corresponding changes in explicit evaluations, both for participants who received 
only AA instructions, Z = 0.70, p = .49, and participants who received AA instructions in addition 
to AA training, Z = -0.07, p = .95. The effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations remained 
significant after controlling for changes in explicit evaluations (no training: Z = 2.66, p = .008; 
training: Z = 5.71, p < .001). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided both correlational and experimental evidence that the impact of 
AA instructions on implicit evaluation is not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluation. 
First, correlational analyses show that changes in explicit evaluation only partly mediated the 
effects of AA instructions on implicit evaluation. That is, AA instructions (and AA training) 
caused effects on implicit evaluations that remained significant after controlling for the mediating 
impact of explicit evaluations. This finding corroborates the correlational results of Van Dessel et 
al. (2015). Second, and most importantly, we found an experimental dissociation on implicit and 
explicit evaluations with regard to the impact of AA instructions (and AA training). More 
specifically, when trait instructions were presented, AA instructions and AA training caused 
changes in implicit but not explicit evaluations. Participants who received information about the 
evaluative traits of the social groups did not take the AA instructions or training into account 
when expressing their explicit evaluation, yet still exhibited an implicit preference for the 
approached group. This resembles previous findings of changes in implicit, but not explicit 
evaluations as a result of the repeated pairing of stimuli (e.g., Gawronski & LeBel, 2008) and 
indicates that both AA instructions and AA training can cause changes in implicit evaluation 
even when participants do not consider this information as a valid source of evaluative 
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information. Given the well-known limitations of correlational mediation analyses, our 
experimental results provide important new evidence for the conclusion that AA instructions can 
influence implicit evaluations directly, that is, without first changing explicit evaluations. These 
findings contradict the idea that instructions influence implicit evaluations only if these 
instructions are considered a valid basis for evaluation and, hence, are incorporated in explicit 
evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009).  
In addition to showing that instructions can influence implicit evaluations even when they 
are not considered a valid basis for evaluation, the present findings also provide information 
about another important research question that has informed research on the nature of implicit 
evaluation. Specifically, they inform us on whether the formation and change of implicit 
evaluations can occur rapidly. In line with Van Dessel et al. (2015) and other studies (e.g., De 
Houwer, 2006; Peters & Gawronski, 2011) our findings challenge the widespread assumption 
(e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006) that implicit evaluations are slow to build. Additionally, and 
more importantly, these findings indicate that existing implicit evaluations can also be altered 
rapidly, as the result of AA instructions. When participants’ evaluations were biased in favor of 
one of the two social groups as the result of trait instructions, subsequent AA instructions still 
caused changes in the implicit evaluation of these groups. This contrasts with previous findings 
suggesting that, once established, implicit evaluations cannot be easily changed (Gregg et al., 
2006; Rydell, McConnell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007). Recently, however, research 
has shown that new valenced information about a stimulus can lead to a rapid revision of implicit 
evaluations, but only when this information is considered highly diagnostic about the evaluative 
properties of this stimulus (Mann, Cone & Ferguson, 2015; Cone & Ferguson, 2015). Our 
findings go beyond this previous research by showing that rapid alterations in implicit 
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evaluations can occur in the absence of changes in explicit evaluations. AA instructions may thus 
rapidly alter existing implicit evaluations even if these instructions are not considered diagnostic 
of the valence of the stimulus.  
Experiment 1, however, did not include a control condition to estimate effects of trait 
instructions and AA instructions separately. Hence, although the results of Experiment 1 confirm 
our main hypothesis that instructions can cause changes in implicit evaluations in the absence of 
changes in explicit evaluations, they do not demonstrate conclusively that instructions can also 
counteract existing implicit evaluations directly. For instance, because of a lack of a control 
condition, it is theoretically possible that our results were due to the fact that compatible AA 
instructions strengthened the previously acquired implicit evaluations rather than that 
incompatible AA instructions revised them. To examine this question and to ascertain that the 
finding of a direct influence of AA instructions on implicit evaluations in Experiment 1 was not a 
chance finding, we performed Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we further explored AA instruction effects in the context of trait 
instructions. The aim of this experiment was two-fold. First, we aimed to replicate the finding 
that AA instructions cause a direct influence on implicit evaluation in the absence of changes in 
explicit evaluation. In contrast to Experiment 1, we counterbalanced the order of the IAT and the 
explicit rating task to exclude the possibility that performing the implicit evaluation task first, 
changed the effects on explicit evaluations (see Perugini, Richetin & Zogmaister, 2014). Second, 
we extended the previous findings by addressing whether AA instructions cause changes in 
implicit evaluation when AA instructions are compatible or incompatible with the trait 
instructions. To this end, participants were provided with either compatible AA and trait 
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instructions, incompatible AA and trait instructions or only trait instructions. Including a 
condition with only trait instructions allowed us to estimate the effect of trait instructions on 
evaluations (i.e., the preference for the group that is presented as positive) and examine whether 
compatible or incompatible AA instructions moderate this effect.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 823 English-speaking volunteers who participated online 
via the Project Implicit research website. Data-exclusion involved removing 195 participants who 
did not complete all tasks (23.7%), and 156 participants who did not correctly answer the 
memory questions (24.8%), leaving data from 472 participants (307 women, mean age = 38, SD 
= 13). None of the participants had previously participated in Experiment 1. 
Procedure. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following points. 
First, participants were randomly assigned to start with the IAT and then perform the explicit 
rating task or to perform tasks in the opposite order. Second, participants never received actual 
AA training. Third, all of the participants received trait instructions. Fourth, not all of the 
participants received AA instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either (1) 
no AA instructions, (2) instructions to approach Niffites and avoid Luupites, or (3) instructions to 
approach Luupites and avoid Niffites. Hence, this experiment employed a 2 (Content of Trait 
Instructions: Niffites are good, Luupites are good) x 3 (AA Instructions: approach Niffites, 
approach Luupites, no AA instructions) between-subjects design (Table 3).  
Split-half reliability of the IAT score was r(472) = .92. Internal consistency of the explicit 
evaluation score was high (Cronbach’s Alpha = .96), and this score correlated significantly with 
the IAT score, r(470) = .59, p < .001. 
Results 
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A 3 (AA Instructions: Approach Niffites, Approach Luupites, no AA instructions) x 2 
(Content of Trait Instructions: Niffites are good, Luupites are good) ANOVA on the IAT scores 
revealed a main effect of Content of Trait Instructions, F(1,466) = 377.50, p < .001, indicating 
that participants preferred Niffites more when Niffites were presented as positive and Luupites as 
negative (M = 0.26, SD = 0.48) than when Niffites were presented as negative and Luupites as 
positive (M = -0.54, SD = 0.39), d = 1.82, 95% CI [1.60, 2.04], BF1 > 10000. Most importantly, 
we also observed a main effect of AA Instructions, F(2,466) = 4.59, p = .011 (Table 4). In line 
with Experiment 1, participants who had been instructed to approach Niffites and avoid Luupites 
(M = -0.02, SD = 0.58) preferred Niffites more than participants who had been instructed to 
approach Luupites and avoid Niffites (M = -0.27, SD = 0.55), F(1,309) = 9.24, p = .003, d = 0.44, 
95% CI [0.21, 0.66], BF1 = 131.22. Compared to participants who had not received AA 
instructions (M = -0.08, SD = 0.62), participants who had received instructions to approach 
Luupites preferred Luupites more, F(1,313) = 4.98, p = .026, but we observed no significant 
difference for participants who had received approach Niffites instructions, F(1,310) = 0.41, p = 
.52.  
To examine whether compatible or incompatible AA instructions cause changes in 
evaluations we performed planned tests comparing the main effect of Content of Trait 
Instructions for participants who received no AA instructions, participants who received 
compatible AA instructions and participants who received incompatible AA instructions. 
Importantly, the main effect of Content of Trait Instructions was reduced when AA instructions 
were incompatible with the trait instructions, d = 1.39, 95% CI [1.01, 1.78], compared to when no 
AA instructions were provided, d = 1.85, 95% CI [1.47, 2.23], F(1,291) = 5.24, p = .023, 
indicating that incompatible AA instructions influenced implicit evaluations. In contrast, the 
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main effect of Content of Trait Instructions was not significantly different for participants who 
received compatible AA instructions, d = 2.15, 95% CI [1.78, 2.53] compared to participants who 
received no AA instructions, F(1,332) = 0.34, p = .56. 
The 3 x 2 ANOVA on explicit ratings revealed only the main effect of Content of Trait 
Instructions, F(1,466) = 370.73, p < .001, d = 1.80, 95% CI [1.58, 2.01], indicating a larger 
preference for Niffites when they were presented as positive (M = 2.76, SD = 3.37) than when 
they were presented as negative (M = -3.34, SD = 3.42). We did not observe a significant main 
effect of AA Instructions, F(1,466) = 0.36, p = .70, nor an interaction effect with Content of Trait 
Instructions, F(1,466) = 0.47, p = .63. Also, the main effect of Content of Trait Instructions did 
not differ significantly between participants who received compatible, incompatible or no AA 
Instructions, Fs < 0.37, ps > .54, BF0s > 7.00.  
AA instructions condition. In line with Experiment 1, mediation analyses on the data of 
participants who received both AA and trait instructions showed that AA instruction effects on 
implicit evaluations were not significantly mediated by corresponding changes in explicit 
evaluations, Z = 1.87, p = .062. The effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations remained 
significant after controlling for explicit evaluations, Z = 2.92, p = .003. 
Discussion 
Results from Experiment 2 provide further support for the idea that the impact of AA 
instructions on implicit evaluations is not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. 
Replicating the pattern obtained in Experiment 1, participants who received AA instructions 
exhibited an implicit, but not an explicit preference for the approached group over the avoided 
group when prior instructions specified the valence of these groups. Mediation analyses indicated 
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that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluation were not fully mediated by changes in explicit 
evaluation in the context of trait instructions. 
Additionally, results indicated that AA instructions caused changes in implicit evaluation 
even when the valence implied by the approach or avoidance action was incompatible with the 
evaluative information provided in the trait instructions. This suggests that AA instructions can 
(partly) undo recently established implicit evaluations, even in the absence of changes in explicit 
evaluations. This contrasts evidence that implicit evaluations are more difficult to change than 
explicit evaluations with verbally presented counter-attitudinal information (Gregg et al., 2006). 
We found no evidence that AA instructions caused changes in implicit evaluations when these 
instructions were compatible with the trait instructions. This is consistent with previous findings 
that AA training causes changes in implicit evaluations of social groups only when the training is 
incompatible with participants’ evaluations (Kawakami et al., 2007). It suggests that AA effects 
may be strongly reduced when participants have clearly univalent positive or negative implicit 
evaluations and corroborates previous evidence that the effectiveness of instructions to approach 
or avoid a stimulus may critically depend on specific stimulus properties (e.g., whether a stimulus 
is novel or well-known; see Van Dessel et al., 2015). 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we observed that instructions to approach or avoid members of a 
fictitious group impact implicit evaluations of these groups. Our results indicate that these 
changes in implicit evaluation are not fully mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. 
Experiment 1 provided evidence that participants who merely received AA instructions and 
participants who received additional AA training exhibited a direct effect on implicit evaluations. 
Moreover, both procedures caused changes in implicit evaluations even when trait instructions 
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clearly specified the valence of the groups which canceled any AA effect on explicit evaluative 
ratings. Experiment 2 corroborated that AA instructions influenced implicit, but not explicit 
evaluations in the context of trait instructions and extended these findings by showing that AA 
instructions caused changes in implicit evaluations when AA instructions were incompatible with 
the trait instructions. 
These findings have meaningful theoretical and practical implications. We first discuss 
implications for theories on the mental processes that underlie implicit evaluation. Afterwards, 
we discuss implications for mental process theories that account for AA instruction and AA 
training effects. Finally, we discuss practical implications of the present research. 
Implications for theories of implicit evaluation 
The current experiments provide important information that constrains current and future 
models of implicit evaluation. First, the observation that AA instructions have a direct influence 
on implicit evaluation (i.e., independent of changes in explicit evaluation) is difficult to reconcile 
with associative and dual-process models of evaluation that only allow for evaluative associations 
to form (1) gradually as the result of many pairings (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006) or (2) rapidly when consciously entertaining the proposition that a stimulus is 
positive or negative (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). However, dual-process models can 
accommodate these findings if they allow for the immediate formation of associations even on 
the basis of information that is not considered to be valid. Also propositional single-process 
accounts of evaluation can account for our results if they assume that the automatic activation of 
propositional information underlies implicit evaluation (De Houwer, 2014). More specifically, 
receiving AA instructions may allow participants to consider the proposition that the approached 
social group is positive. A dissociation between implicit and explicit evaluation will arise when 
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this proposition is judged to be invalid (and thus dismissed when making an explicit evaluation) 
but still automatically retrieved when the social group is implicitly evaluated. 
Second, the observation that incompatible AA instructions reduce effects of trait 
instructions on implicit, but not on explicit evaluations suggests that implicit evaluations can be 
updated rapidly. It provides direct evidence against the often entertained idea that implicit 
evaluations are more difficult to change than explicit evaluations via counter-attitudinal 
information (Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006). Rather, changes in explicit 
evaluation seem to critically depend on the perceived validity of the obtained evaluative 
information (Peters & Gawronski, 2011). When information directly contradicts previous valence 
information, this causes an immediate reversal of participants’ explicit liking of the stimulus 
(Gregg et al., 2006). Because AA instructions do not invalidate the more diagnostic evaluative 
trait information, they do not influence explicit evaluation when they contradict trait instructions. 
In contrast, changes in implicit evaluations may arise as the result of any information that links a 
stimulus with a specific valence, such as information about its relation with another valenced 
stimulus (see Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014) or with a valenced action (Van Dessel et 
al., 2015). Immediate changes in implicit evaluation may occur, even when participants do not 
consider the obtained information as valid.  
Note that the present findings do not contradict the idea that the impact of counter-
attitudinal information strongly depends on the diagnosticity of this information (Cone & 
Ferguson, 2015). In fact, our data also suggest that AA instructions have a stronger influence on 
implicit evaluation if they are more diagnostic. This can be inferred from the fact that we 
observed a bigger AA instruction effect in the absence of trait instructions, that is, when the AA 
instructions were the most diagnostic piece of information that was available to the participants. 
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However, our results extend the previous research by showing that changes in implicit 
evaluations may occur as the result of instructions even when these instructions provide 
information that is not considered highly diagnostic of the evaluative properties of the stimulus 
and therefore do not influence explicit evaluations. This effect is automatic in the sense that, in all 
likelihood, our participants did not intend to use this information for their evaluation. 
In sum, the current findings provide important information for theories that explain how 
implicit evaluations arise and can be changed. Although our results cannot distinguish between 
the broad class of single-process propositional and the broad class of dual-process models, they 
do force these models into adopting specific assumptions without which they cannot account for 
our effects. In general, we believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between 
broad classes of models like dual-process or single-process models that have such a high degree 
of flexibility. Therefore, we believe that, in order to further advance research on evaluation, it is 
necessary to (1) define specific models (e.g., propositional or association-formation models of 
AA effects) that make testable predictions and (2) perform research to test these predictions. The 
data produced by such research will allow us to further constrain these models and to have 
greater confidence in the assumptions that survive this process. 
Implications for accounts of AA instruction and AA training effects  
First, the current findings indicate that instructions that link a valenced action and a 
fictitious social group cause unintentional changes in the implicit evaluation of these groups. This 
extends knowledge about the effects of AA instructions by showing that these effects are not 
necessarily the result of controlled, non-automatic processes that involve the intentional use of 
this information for evaluation (e.g., as the result of demand compliance) (Van Dessel et al., 
2015). 
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Second, our results also constrain ideas about the processes that underlie AA training 
effects. More specifically, they reveal important similarities between the effects of AA training 
and those of AA instructions. Not only can both interventions lead to changes in implicit 
evaluations, they both can have direct effects on implicit evaluations, that is, effects that are not 
mediated by changes in explicit evaluations. Although these similarities do not prove that both 
types of effects are due to the same mental processes (e.g., the formation and activation of 
propositions), they are in line with this idea and hence undermine the position that AA training 
effects can be due only to low level processes such as the gradual, performance-driven formation 
of associations in memory (e.g., Woud et al., 2013; Phills, Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, & Inzlicht, 
2011). Future studies are required to establish whether instructions and pairings are also similar 
regarding other features, for example regarding uncontrollability (see Gawronski, Balas, & 
Creighton, 2014). 
Finally, our findings suggest that actually performing AA behavior may, under certain 
conditions, add to the effect of AA instructions on implicit evaluations. Experiment 1 included a 
direct comparison of AA instruction and AA training effects on implicit and explicit evaluations. 
For participants who did not receive trait instructions, additional AA training did not have an 
added effect even though we had sufficient statistical power to detect even a small effect (power 
= .77 to detect an effect size of d = 0.25). In contrast, participants who received trait instructions 
exhibited a stronger AA effect on implicit evaluation when AA instructions were supplemented 
with AA training. Whether this added effect of AA training involves the strengthening of the 
previously obtained knowledge structures (i.e., associations or propositions) or the acquisition of 
entirely different knowledge structures requires further research. 
Practical Implications 
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AA training is considered an important procedure for the modification of pathological 
biases in cognitive functioning (see Woud & Becker, 2014). Repeatedly performing AA 
movements in response to specific stimuli has proven effective in a number of therapeutic 
contexts such as the treatment of alcohol addiction (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & 
Lindenmeyer, 2011), social anxiety (Taylor & Amir, 2012), or contamination-related fear (Amir, 
Kuckertz, & Najmi, 2013). Given the important relation between implicit evaluation and the 
dysfunctional behavioral responses under investigation (see Houben, Havermans, & Wiers, 
2010), it can be argued that changes in implicit evaluation may (partly) underlie therapeutic 
effects of AA training. Following this reasoning, our current results may indicate that AA 
instructions could play an important role in these AA training effects. Preliminary evidence 
supporting this idea was found in a recent study by Wiers et al. (2014) where therapeutic effects 
of ‘avoid alcohol’ training at one month follow-up were more robust if participants had received 
explicit instructions to push alcohol away in addition to the re-training procedure. Future research 
might consider whether replacing or complementing AA training with AA instructions may 
improve the therapeutic effectiveness of AA training. 
Concluding remarks 
In sum, the present results extend past findings that verbal instructions influence implicit 
evaluation by showing that AA instruction effects on implicit evaluations occur in the absence of 
mediation by changes in explicit evaluation. These findings provide insight into the mechanisms 
underlying implicit evaluation and open up important new avenues for changing implicit 
evaluations. 
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Table 1. 
Experimental Design of Experiment 1. 
3 between participants variables: 
    
Trait Instructions AA instructions AA training 
    
  Approach Niffites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
 Niffites are good  
(25%) 
  
  Approach Luupites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
Present (50 %)    
  Approach Niffites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
 Niffites are bad 
(25 %) 
  
  Approach Luupites (12.5%) Yes (6.25%) 
No (6.25%) 
    
  Approach Niffites (25%) Yes (12.5%) 
No (12.5%) 
Absent (50%)    
  Approach Luupites (25%) Yes (12.5%) 
No (12.5%) 
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Table 2. 
Mean IAT and Explicit Scores in Experiment 1 for participants who received trait instructions as 
a function of Content of Trait Instructions and Content of AA Instructions. 
 Content of Trait Instructions 
 Niffites good and Luupites bad Niffites bad and Luupites good 
 
IAT score: 
Approach Niffites Approach Luupites Approach Niffites Approach Luupites 
No AA training 
AA training 
0.42 (0.37) 
0.49 (0.37) 
0.05 (0.47) 
-0.09 (0.46) 
 
-0.40 (0.48) 
-0.39 (0.53) 
 
-0.40 (0.39) 
-0.62 (0.39) 
Explicit score:   
No AA training 
AA training 
3.20 (3.08) 
1.64 (2.89) 
2.27 (3.49) 
1.49 (2.63) 
-3.99 (3.51) 
-3.21 (3.51) 
-3.11 (3.00) 
-2.79 (3.38) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Scores reflect a relative preference for Niffites over 
Luupites. 
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Table 3. 
Experimental Design of Experiment 2. 
2 between participants variables: 
  
Trait Instructions AA instructions 
  
 Compatible: Approach Niffites (16.7%) 
Niffites are good (50 %) Incompatible: Approach Luupites (16.7%) 
 No AA instructions (16.7%) 
  
 Incompatible: Approach Niffites (16.7%) 
Luupites are good (50 %) Compatible: Approach Luupites (16.7%) 
 No AA instructions (16.7%) 
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Table 4.  
Mean IAT and Explicit Scores in Experiment 2 as a function of Content of Trait Instructions and 
AA Instructions. 
 Content of Trait Instructions 
 Niffites good and Luupites bad Niffites bad and Luupites good 
 Approach 
Niffites 
Approach 
Luupites 
No AA 
instructions 
Approach 
Niffites 
Approach 
Luupites 
No AA 
instructions 
IAT score:  0.31 (0.47) 0.15 (0.46) 0.31 (0.50) -0.46 (0.41) -0.60 (0.36) -0.54 (0.40) 
Explicit score: 3.07 (3.13) 2.38 (4.02) 2.75 (3.04) -3.40 (3.80) -3.34 (3.41) -3.29 (3.10) 
 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Scores reflect a relative preference for Niffites over 
Luupites. 
